

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 7, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: H. Waugh and W. White, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending September 7, 2001

DNFSB Activity Summary: The Pantex Plant was closed on Monday for the Labor Day Holiday. H. Waugh was on site for the remainder of the week. W. White was on leave Tuesday and was on site for the remainder of the week.

W78 Program: NNSA/AAO approved the W78 Hazard Analysis Report (HAR) and Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) changes submitted by BWXT to address the conditions of approval in the previous AAO Safety Evaluation Report (SER) of the W78 authorization basis. The new SER, approving the authorization basis changes, also requires additional changes to the W78 HAR and TSRs. However, AAO will not require BWXT to resubmit those changes for approval. Some of the more significant findings include the following:

- Prior to starting W78 operations, BWXT must obtain documentation for design agency approval of various uses of weapons response information in the W78 authorization basis.
- The common wall between an operating bay and an adjacent fan room is credited in the safety analysis as a fire barrier but is noted to have known deficiencies. The deficiencies are to be corrected or a combustible loading control must be implemented to protect the wall.
- An administrative control requires that lift heights be only as high as needed to perform the operation. BWXT will be required to assure that lift heights also maintain the weapons response assumptions in the safety analysis.
- The in-service inspection for detonator connector covers should be revised to reference the basis for the acceptability of the leakage current criteria. In addition, BWXT should establish procedures to define visual inspection criteria more clearly.
- The W78 authorization basis change restricted the application of an administrative control for puncture probes to certain bay configurations only. That change was not approved, and the control must be applied to bay and cell operations.

In addition to addressing previous AAO comments, the W78 authorization basis change also identified new hazards scenarios and addressed proposed changes in W78 operations. AAO identified one new pre-start condition of approval and ten new post-start conditions relative to the new analysis. [II.A]

W80 Command Disablement (CD) Testing: At the end of July, BWXT submitted its proposed plan of action for the W80 CD contractor readiness assessment to NNSA/AL. Earlier this week, NNSA/AL approved the plan of action and delegated responsibility for conducting the NNSA readiness assessment to AAO. Of interest, the plan of action identifies only four prerequisites: verify that core requirements are ready for review, meet the requirements of the authorization basis implementation plan, complete a technical assist, and certify in writing that readiness has been achieved. Start of the contractor readiness assessment will not begin until AAO has approved a justification for continued operation of W80 CD testing. Approval is expected next week. As of Friday, no dates had been set for conducting the BWXT or NNSA readiness assessment or for conducting the actual command disablement test. [II.A]